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POLmCAL DEBATES ON PUBLIC TELEVISION:
THBFORBESCASE
by

Robert Wiener"
L Introduction
Televised political debates, especially in races for higher office, are common in
the United States. Debates are not constitutionally required.' but voters expect to see
candidates tested against each other.1 Technology has changed the way political
campaigns are conducted with television playing an ever more important role. If a
televised debate take place, who has a right to participate? If a private television station
4
or organization3 sponsors the debate, it is governed only by legislation. However, if the
debate is sponsored by a public television station, the United States Constitution,
specifically the freedom of speech clause of the First Amendment, may apply.! The case
of Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Ralph P. Forbes confronts this issue.

IL TheStory
Ralph Forbes, a self-proclaimed Christian Supremacist, member of the American
Nazi Party, and speaker at Klan callies, collected the signatures of more than 2,000 voters
from an Arkansas congressional district in 1992. 6 He thereby qualified to be on the ballot
for his run as an independent candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives as an
independent candidate. The five-station Arkansas Educational Television Network
{AETN), owned by the Arkansas Educational Television Commission (ABTC),
sponsored a series of one-hour candidates debates, but only invited the Democratic and
7
Republican candidates' to participate. Forbes asked to be included, but was refused.
AETC based its decisions on its judgment that be was not a "viable" candidate or
9
"newsworthy''.8 Forbes sued the AETC, but the District Court Decided against bim and
he did not participate in the debate.

In the election, Forbes won 2.5 percent of the vote. The winning margin was 3
percent. 1 Forbes appealed the District Court decision and, in August 1996, the Court of
11
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found for Forbes on First Amendment grounds. The
12
United States Supreme Court decided the case in 1998.

°

II. Freedom of Speech
The United States Constitution governs when state state action is involved.13 A
station is a state actor, so the constitution applies here. Forbes and the
public
AETC argued the case on First Amendment grounds.
Several freedom of speech issues are raised by this case. Why protect speech? Is
freedom of speech absolute? If not, how much legal protection does free speech get? Is
all speech treated alike or are some kinds of speech entitled to greater protection? If so,
how much?
Concerning political debates, do all candidates for political office have a legal

right to be included in all political debates for that office? What if the candidate has
qualified to be on the ballot? Are only the two major parties entitled to debate? Do the
politics of the candidates matter? Do the prelinllnary polls, that is, the projected support
at election time matter? Does money raised by a candidate matter? If minority
candidates are kept out of debates does that constitute unconstitutional censorship? If a
candidate's viewpoints are considered reprehensible do they have less of a right to speak?
What if a third party candidate is ahead in the polls of one of the two major party
candidates?'4 Does the forum matter, that is, if the debate is in print, radio, television. or
the Internet?
Does the issue of political debates on public television also concern freedom of
the press? The freedom of speech clause of the First Amendment states that "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech ...." 15 But the First Amendment
also bas a freedom of the press component, "Congress shall make no law .. _ abridging the
freedom ... of the press...''?16 Does the press have a protected freedom to hold debates
between candidates of its choice? Is that freedom more restricted if the press is public?
Is television "the press"? If there a conflict between the candidate's freedom of speech
17
and the press's freedom of the press how is it resolved? These are questions that the
Supreme Court chose not to discuss. Rather, it spoke exclusively in freedom of speech
terms, both for the candidate and the public television station.

ill. First Amendment Theory
To better understand this case, it is helpful to first consider the philosophy and
history of the First Amendment.

A. Absolutist vs. Codified English Law

*

Associate Professor of Legal Studies, Lubin School of Business, Pace University
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The freedom of speech clause of the First Amendment reads "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speecli .. .." 11 On the face of it, it is
unambiguous. Some have suggested that its appropriate reading is absolutist, that
Congress shall make no such law. This interpretation would forbid any governmental
restriction on speech. Then what of the passing of government military secrets to an
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enemy?19 Or the use of the words of another Without permission'F And is this clause
limited congressional acts or.is it extended to other legislative bodies and the executive
and judicial branches? What of common law actions for defamation? Or shouting "Fire!"
falsely in a crowded theater'f1 An absolutist reading would have results both too broad in
terms of the speech allowed and too narrow in terms of the political institutions covered.

speech. The instrumental theory seems to underlie Justice Stevens's concern m
"government censorship and propaganda."30
IV. Freedom ofSpeech Cases

An alternative reading is to understand the First Amendment as a codification of
the English law of its time of the First Amendment. 22 If so, only previous restraints by
the govemtnent would be prohibited?! However, the Supreme Court has decided that
post-publication penalties are banned by the First Amendment.24

A Supreme Court approach to interpretation and application of the freedom of
speech clause has developed in a series of opinions by Holmes and Brandeis. This line of
as
opinions in
1920s and was later adopted by the Supreme
Court. It IS prenused on the understanding that freedom of speech is not absolute but
.may be restricted by the government. However, government may not censor polltical
speech merely because it disagrees with a speaker's viewpoint.n This is capitalist
economic theory applied to constitutional political theory - Holmes's notion of "free
trade in ideas." 33

B. Why Protect Speech?

As is true of its companion amendments in the Bill of Rights, the open texture of
the words of the First Amendment lends itself to intetpretation. Although the point is still
debated, the prevailing jurisprudence of constitutional interpretation applauds the
opportunity for the Constitution to develop over time,Zs rather than being restricted to the
original intent of its authors.16
Therefore, to determine the meaning of the First Amendment, courts have asked
the question, "Why protect speech?" What is the objective of freedom of speech? If we
know our objective, they suggest, we will better know how to get there. In recent cases,
courts have considered two theories.
Under the instrumental theory presented by Alexander Meik:eljoho, government
restriction of speech is seen as interference with the .free flow of information preventing
the public from making informed democratic choices.:P This interpretation focuses on the
listener's right to listen. This is the theory reflected in the opinions of Justices Holmes
and Brandeis promoting a free lll8Tket in ideas, As the court stated it mote recently, "It is
of particular importance that candidates have the opportunity to make their views known
so that the electorate may intelligently evaluate the candidates' personal qualities and
their positions on vital public issues before choosing among them on election day."18

The dignitary theory advanced by Tom Emerson considers self-expression to be
an essential component of human dign.ity.211 This theory focuses on the speaker's right to
speak, that is, on the speaker's freedom of speech, rather than the listener's freedom to
listen.
The instrumental theory is the more commonly used approach in First
Amendment cases, but little is made of traditional freedom of speech theory in the Forbes
case. The dignitary theory is not directly discussed and neither the majority nor the
dissent consider Forbes's right to speak. There is some concern in the dissent as to
Forbe's right to speak compared to other candidates who are pennitted to participate in
debates. But this is a relative right to speak rather than a constitutional freedom of

24

A. Holmes-Brandeis

Government may restrict the content of speech, but only if it has a high interest in
34
the speech.
This state interest must be compelling. For the state to act on its
compelling interest there must also be an extremely close causal connection between the
35
speech and the anticipated hatm such that state action is necessary. Even then, that state
action must be drawn as narrowly as possible, the least restrictive alternative so as not to
restrict permitted speech. In other words, government censorship is not constitutional if a
less limiting action is possible. This judicial content based analysis of abridging of
freedom of speech by a court is called strict scrutiny.36
B. Content Analysis

The Supreme Court has made a distinction between content-based and contentneutral governmental restrictions on freedom of speech. If the content of governmental
the tir,ne. place, manner of speech is neutral, for example parade permit
statutes, 1t wdl recetve a somewhat more relaxed scrutiny.' 8
Applying First Amendment content analysis to Turner Broadcasting television
the Supreme
decided by a 5-4 majority that a content neutral regulation
reqwnng cable comparues to carry public television stations, ''may treat categories of
speakers differently without being labeled content-based as long as little risk exists that
the regulation will be used to control what the speakers say." 40 The distinction between
content neutral and content based regulations is crucial to the outcome of a case. Content
based regulations are much more likely to be found unconstitutional.

C. Forum aassification
The Supreme Court has developed a hierarchy of protection of speech from
governmental restrictions based on the nature of the forum. Those forums which are
more
open to public debate receive a higher degree of judicial
scrutiny. Forum classification was adopted over the objections of Justice Brennan who
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would have granted strict scrutiny protection from state action to all protected speech
regardless ofthe forum. 4 1
The Court classifies a forum, in order of decreasing constitutional speech
protection, as (1) a traditional public forum, (2) a limited public forum, or (3) a nonpublic forum.

1. Traditional public forum
A traditional public forum is a place where the public would be traditionally
welcome to speak. In a traditional public forum abridgment of speech is pennitted only if
it is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and if the restriction is narrowly drawn
to achieve that end. 'This is a strict Scrutiny test. Courts will scrutinize closely the
governmental restriction of speech and declare it constitutional only if it meets this test.
In other words, government officials have very limited discretion to restrain the
expression of ideas in traditionally public forums.
Even so, if the strict scrutiny test is passed, the state may so act. In the case of
Davis v. Massachusetts42 the United States Supreme Court followed a Massachusetts case
opinion by
A speaker on the Boston Commons was arrested for speaking
without a permit. Holmes argued for absolute governmental power in this case. "[F]or
the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or
public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for
the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house.'M4 In the past century, the judicial
trend bas been to increase the protection given to speakers. Since the Davis case,
traditional public forwn First Amendment protection has been provided to streets, parks,
and other public places held by govem.m.ent. 45

2. Limited public forum
Limited public forum is a term applied to typically non-public places which serve
as public forums for limited times or for selected classes of persons."" For those limited
times or persons, courts apply the traditional public forum test. 47 At other times or for
persons not within the selected class, they are treated as non-public forums . Limited
public forums include the opening of university facilities to student groups•• and a
municipal theater made available for theater productions.49
3. Non-public forum
A non-public forum is neither a traditional nor a limited public forum; that is,
neither tradition nor designation makes it a forum for public communication. so Public
property is not a public forum simply because it is governmental. 51 An example of a nonpublic forum is a public school mail system even if made available to a community
organization.52
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Speech in a non-public forum is still constitutionally protected, but to a much
lesser degree. A rational basis or reasonableness test is used here under which the state
may regulate speech as long as that regulation is reasonable and not merely content based
censorship, an effort to suppress views opposed by public officials.53 Judicial review in
these cases is much more relaxed and courts typically defer to the state.
3. Application ofForum Classification

Forum designation is often outcome determinative. Governmental restrictions in
traditional public forums are much more likely to be found unconstitutional than similar
restrictions in non-traditional public forums. Once the forum is classified, the legal
question is whether the appropriate standard has been properly applied.
V Forbes Case
A . Choosing Up Sides

The Forbes case excited many to weigh in with amicus curiae briefs. The side
choosing has resulted in some strange bedfellows. On the side of Ralph Forbes are the
Greens/Green Party USA, 54 Perot '96,'' Eugene McCarthy, the American Civil Liberties
Union, and the Brennan Center for Justice. 56 The Rutherford Institute paid for Forbes's
counse1.57 On the side of AETC were the United States Justice Department, the Federal
Communications Commission, the Commission on Presidential Debates," the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting, the Association of America's Public Television
Stations, 20 states, and New York City.
B. Forum Classification
What is the appropriate forum classification for public television sponsored
candidates' debates? The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in this case decided that it was
a public forum. S9 The Eleventh Circuit, in a similar case, determined that, because it "was
stated in order for candidates to express their views on campaign issues," it was "a
limited-purpose public forum.'.ro The Justice Department brief claimed that "Sponsorship
by a state actor does not convert a news program into a public forum.' 161 Kelly
Shackelford, Forbes's counsel, argued "If a government-sponsored and -planned debate is
not a limited public forum, one can only wonder what is."61

The Supreme Court recognized the important threshold nature of this question.
"[l]t is instructive to ask whether public forum principles apply to the case at at1."63 The
court began to discuss the public forum doctrine, but very shortly it was discussing the
sui generis nature of journalism in general and television broadcasting in particular and
became uninterested in forum classification. "In the case of television broadcasting,
however, broad rights of access for outside speakers would be antithetical, as a general
rule, to the discretion that stations and their editorial staff must exercise to fulfill their
journalistic purpose and statutory obligations.'164 The court emphasized the need for
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deferring to the editorial discretion of broadcasters without really considering the
constitution.65 This seems to be a case of begging the question. The majority engaged in
scrutiny far less than strict before it had even determined the type of forum involved and,
therefore, the appropriate level of scrutiny.
Not surpri.singly, the court eventually decided that the political debate on public
television was a non-public forum..66 Once this forum classification was made the end
was in sight.
The notion that television is not a traditional public forum seems to result from
the adoption of a narrow definition of tradition. The public square or town hall may have
been the traditional forum for political debate at the time of the drafting of the First
Amendment and the Lincoln-Douglas debates67 • But our political tradition evolves and
many years have passed since the televised Kennedy-Nixon debates. 61 Today, I believe,
we would much more expect a televised debate for a congressional seat that than a nonbroadcast debate in a "traditional" public space. If we don't grant the highest
constitutional protection to political speech broadcast on our public airways through the
auspices of a governmental agency, I fear for the protection of all speech.
The dissent took a step back from forum classification suggesting a more general
issue, "whether AETC defined the contours of the debate forum with sufficient specificity
to justify the exclusion of a ballot--qualified candidate.'o69 Although the dissent seemed
unhappy with forum analysis, 70 it did suggest that televised political debates are most like
parade permits.11 That would seem to imply limited-public forum analysis as with

The dissent expressed concern protection of public television presented "the risk
of government censorship and propaganda in a way that protection of privately owned
1

broadcasters does not:"

D. Speaker Selection
If speaker selection is restricted by the Constitution, what are the rules? How do
public media decide who has a right to speak: when?

I. Traditional Candidate Test
How important is our traditional two-party political system in this case? Should
the candidates of the Democratic and Republican parties automatically participate in
candidate debates and not others? After all, what chance do they have to win? u Or, as
Perot '96 argued, is it true that "The whole point of a political campaign period is
allow candidates - through popular appeals, organizing, and debates - to change pubhc
The
opinion", not "self·petpetuating rule by Republicans and
found value in diversity of opinion quoting an earlier case that "political figures outstde
the two major parties have been fertile sources of new ideas and new programs; many of
their challenges to the status quo have in time made their was into the political
mainstream...as

2. Good Faith Test

71

Ward.

6

Good faith has played a role in other constitutional law cases.' Should we rely on
the good faith of the editor to determine our freedom of speech? The Court of Appeals
argued that the good faith of the AETC is not sufficient." The question should not be one

C. Public and Private Media
If it is all television, broadcast in the same way, why shouldn't public and private
television be judged by the same standards?73 Isn't this case best understood as one of
applying journalistic standards 74 protected by the media's First Amendment freedom of
speech?n
The Eighth Circuit did make a distinction between private and public television.
Constitutional protection is not available unless there is state action. "[A] crucial fact
here is that the people making this judgment were not ordinary journalists: they were
employees of the government. The First Amendment exists to protect individuals, not
govemment."76 "A journalist employed by the government is still a government
employee.'.n And, as the Forbes's brief argues, ''if the broadcasters are state actors, the
First Amendment precludes them from having unfettered journalistic discretion. "78

of faith, but of action.

3. Content-Based Test
Alternatively, should we use the Turner Broadcasting content-based. test, that is,
selection is unconstitutional, but selection on other grounds may not be?
88
AETC agrees that "viewpoint discrimination" is unconstitutional and there was no
smoking gun in evidence rejecting Forbes because of his
do we
distinguish between keeping candidates out of a debate and keepmg mmonty '?ews from
How do we know whether candidate selection for a debate IS content·
being
based? This standard seems far to vague for even the Supreme Court to consider.
4. Rational Basis Test

The Supreme Court largely ignored this distinction, treating all broadcasters,
public and private, alike." By blurring such a distinction, the Court ignored the primacy
of the Constitution.80 Apparently it feared the slippery slope argument of unbridled
speech, for it seemed unable to distinguish debate between political candidates from other
forms ofspeech.81
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We are left with a rational basis test as our final altemative. But if a rational basis
test is used, on what basis can a rational decision be made? AETC's counsel argued for a
test of whether a candidate was "newsworthy'' enough to "best serve the interests of its
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viewers.'si() The AETC also argued for the "political viability" test. But the AETC seems
to have really used the traditional candidate approach because it staged entire debates
majority
when the outcome of the election was hardly in
doubt.
tnajonty parties should not be so sanguine about the results of this
case for then
may not
be politically viable. The Court of Appeals
argued
a declSlon m favor of Forbes IS correct even if we assume the continuation of
a predommantly
system. ..If Mr. Forbes can be excluded today a Republican
or Democrat who is believed to have no chance of success could' be excluded
"Political viability is a tricky concept. We should leave it to the voters at
the polls, and to. the
judgment of nongovernmental joumalists."93
Furth:rmore, the
CircUit observed that Ralph Forbes had, in fact, earned a
plurality of the votes tn the 1990 Arkansas Republican primary for lieutenant governor. 94
. .The Eighth Circuit said that "The question of political viability is, indeed so
subjective,
arguable, so
of variation in individual opinion, as to provide no
secure bas1s for the exerc1se of governmental power consistent witlt the First

Amendment.''95

the.
and the dissent in this case apparently felt that the rational
VIabt.hty. test is the appropriate test. Where they differed, is in their
analysts of the application of the test; that is, whether, in this case, an objective standard
96
was used by AETC staff. As characterized by Justice Stevens the AETC decision was
required was "narrow
an "entirely subjective, ad hoc [judgmentJ,'>97 whereas what
'
objective, and definite standards.'>98
.

E. Competing Freedom of Speech Claims
argument raised here against Forbes is that of competing freedom of

speech chums.. If one speaker gets more freedom of speech, another speaker necessarily
gets less. And 1f there are too speakers no one has an opportunity to engage in meaningful
speech. In other words, does granting freedom of speech to all deny freedom of speech to
aU?
that its
to exclude Forbes resulted in more speech for the
99
Wlth a
ofwmrung. A13 argued by its
Richard Marks in
his
If every
bad a constitutional right to a,Ppear in a debate on public
teleVIsiOn, then public broadcasters would be flooded with requests for access".1oo The
result would be a "cacophony" and no voice would be clearly heard.
The
<:ircuit did not absolutely protect the right of minority candidates to
be heard, but It questioned the exclusion of a candidate on the grounds used.1°1 Forbes's
that the "effect of AETC's approach is to exclude minority voices and
It
for many voices quoting Judge Learned Hand that "right
are
likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through
any kind of authontative selection.••101
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The Supreme Court, concerned at the number of candidates on some ballots, was
persuaded by AETC argument, even adopting the "cacophony" argurnent. 104 In fact, the
court took it even a step further presenting the specter of absolute silence if the public
broadcaster chose that a debate wasn't worth the bother.10s
I believe that at best this is an example of an easy case making bad law. The
perceived evil, too little speech for some, usually the majority candidates, gives more
value to the speech of some candidates than other candidates. Perhaps \Ulequal valuation
of speech makes sense in some cases, to enable the voter to make a decision based oo the
speech of a limited number of
And I believe that the fear of dead air
because of too many candidates is a bogey man. Even if this might happen in some case,
this is not the feared hard case. There were only three candidates on the ballot for this
office and televised debates of three candidates have been held for three presidential
108
candidates107 and for many more candidates in presidential primaries.

The court's concerns as to having toe> many speakers in a debate in which no one
is really heard could be answered either by the dissent's argument that objective
standards simply be established in advance of the selection of debate participants. In
practice, this anticipated problem would probably be resolved through legislation making
access to the ballot increasingly difficult. That raises its own constitutional issues, but
they have apparently been resolved.
Such an interpretation would preserve principle that not everyone has access to

public media. 1cw It might also result in movement to further limit access to the ballot by
increasing the signature requirements for candidacy on the ballot. But decisions on those
potential cases will be left to another day.
Does the broadcaster have freedom of speech claims as well? The court asserted
that "[wJhen a public broadcaster exercises editorial discretion in the selection and
presentation of its programming, it engages in speech activity''110 wbich apparently is
seen as at least as deserving of First Amendment protection as the political speech of a
candidates' debate.m The court's starting point is one of lack of access to the public
press. "[I]n most cases, the First Amendment of its own force does not compel public
broadcasters to allow third parties access to their programming."112 Candidate debates are
then presented as "the narrow exception to the rule" that "public broadcasting as a general
matter does not lend itself to scrutiny under the forum doctrine."113 At first it seems
pretty innocuous - at least debates get some scrutiny. However, by putting debates in the
category of the exception to the rule, Forbes had to play
to prove his exceptional
rather than having burden on AETC justifY its limitation of speech.
The dissent also accepts broad journalistic discretion, just not quite as broad as the
majority. Its primary concern is that here there is "nearly limitless discretion.''114 It
appears that just a little less discretion would have been fine.
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The court, by finding freedom of speech claims for majority candidates and
broadcasters denied freedom of speech to the only two parties who really needed it,
Forbes and the voters.

F. Effects ofDecision
What does the Supreme Court decision mean for political debates on public
television?115 Perhaps it does mean that public television would be more likely to sponsor
political debates.116 They'll certainly be able to ignore marginal candidates such as
Forbes. They will avoid the fear that if the Court of Appeals ruling had been followed, it
might have been extended to public television news programs. 111 The concern of the
a constitutionally protected right to
Supreme Court seems to have been that to
freedom of speech by minority party candidates is to embark on a slippery slope that may
have repercussions far beyond candidate debates. m
If the court had kept its eyes on the ball and decided the case before it on its
merits, rather than being distracted by possible ramifications of its decision, it would have
done a better job. A judicially acceptable selection standard could have been used to
choose participating candidates. Or public television might restrict itself to covering
"bona fide news events,''119 perhaps including broadcasts of privately sponsored political
debates.120
VI. Conclusion
The United States Supreme Court decision was not a foregone conclusion. As
Justice Kennedy stated in his opinion, the court granted a writ of certiorari for this case:,
not only because of its constitutional and practical significance, but also because of a split
in the Circuit Courts of Appeal. The Eleventh Circuit bad decided for a public television
commission, the Georgia Public Telecommunications Comm.ission121 on similar facts.
This decision does danger to the fabric of constitutional law in general and the
First Amendment in particular. As discussed above, it blurs the line between public and
private action, as the dissent notes122 and cheapens the value of freedom of speech by
deciding that everyone has it, but the more powerful just have more ofit.
But the most disappointing aspect of this case is the dissenting opinion. Even if
the dissenting opinion121 had been adopted by the majority of the court, the impact of this
case on constitutional law would not have been significantly different. The dissenters
disagreed more on the application of the constitutional principles124 than on what the
basic appropriate principles are.m The result of this particular case would have been
different, but the bar of constitutional judicial review would have been set only a little bit
The dissent here accepts that the forum is non-public and apparently uses the
weakest form of judicial review available in these cases, the rational basis test Their
question is more of whether the standards that would have been applied to a private
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candidates have already faced off four, six, 10 times." Gail Collins, NEWSDAY, Oct. 14,
1994.
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"The televised debate forum at issue in this case may not squarely fit within our public
forum analysis." Arkansas Educ. Television Cornm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1998
U.S. LEXIS 3102, *46 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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*41 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Surely the Constitution demands at least as much from the Government when it takes
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LEXIS 3102, *35 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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According to Judge Arnold, "We have no doubt that the decision as to political viability
is exactly the kind of journalistic judgment routinely made by newspeople." Forbes v.
Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 93 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1996).

39
38

84

74

The federal Communications Act requires all stations, public and private, to exercise
independent news judgment as a license condition. N.Y. TIMEs, 09 October 1997, at A28.
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Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 93 F.3d 497, 505 (8th Cir. 1996). Part
of this passage was quoted approvingly by the dissent, but it failed to follow the thought
to its logical conclusion. In fact it almost immediately turned its attention to a private
broadcasting case. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1998
U.S. LEXIS 3102, *35 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Forbes brief.

86

Seen. above. The cases repeatedly cited as precedents involve private networks: the
Columbia Broadcasting System in CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) and the Turner
Broadcasting System in Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
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"Much like a university selecting a commencement speaker, a public institution
selecting speakers for a lecture series, or a public school prescribing its curriculum, a
broadcaster by its nature will facilitate the expression of some viewpoints instead of
others." Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1998 U.S.
LEXIS 3102, *14 (1998). Here again, broadcasters, both public and non-public, are
presented as the same.
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"As a general rule, the nature of editorial discretion counsels against subjecting
broadcasters to claims of viewpoint discrimination." Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n
v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633,1998 U.S. LEXIS 3102, *13 (1998). This general rule referred
is not a general constitutional rule. The rule seems to be a case of the Court taking notice
of a general rule of journalism.
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A third party candidate has never won a presidential election and has only infrequently
won a substantial percentage of the vote. But Forbes himself won the most votes for
Lietenant Governor of Arkansas in 1990 in the initial Republican primary and, "in 1958,
in the Second Congressional District, a write-in candidate who equipped his supporters
with stickers that could readily be applied to the ballot defeated the incumbent
Democratic Member of Congress despite the fact that he began his campaign very shortly
before the election." Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 93 F.3d 497, 505
(8th Cir. 1996).
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Although one of those debates (New Hampshire in 1984(?)) resulted in Ronald Reagan

''There is no obvious limiting principle that would afford minor candidates a
constitutional right of access to televised debates but not, for example, to evening news
broadcasts featuring interviews with the major candidates." We may then slide "to grant
rights of television access not just to uninvited candidates, but to anyone with a view
about a matter of public controversy." Justice Department brief.
118

Dellinger compared a candidate debate to an "academic lecrure series sponsored by
state universities." Justice Department brief. Lawrence G. Wallace extended the
argument to the implications for art exhibits at state-run museums. He also questioned
whether a composer would be entitled to equal time after a public broadcast of the
Metropolitan Opera. N.Y. TIMEs, 09 October 1997, at A28.
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Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 93 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1996).
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It seems that the Eighth Circuit had no problem with public broadcasts of private
events, for example, a candidates debate sponsored by the League of Women Voters. But
why shouldn't it? Isn't the result, that the same candidates get to speak and the same
candidates don'tjust the same? How is the distancing not like money laundering?
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Chandler v. Georgia Public Telecommunications Commission, 917 F.2d 486 (11th Cir.
1990).
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"In its discussion of the law, the Court understates the constitutional importance of the
distinction between state ownership and private ownership ofbroadcast facilities."
Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 3102,
*31 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Dissent by Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg join,
Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 3102,
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12• Stevens dissents from the "discussion of the facts" before he dissents from the
"discussion of the law." Dissent, Arkansas Educ.
v. Forbes, 118 S.
Ct. 1633, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 3102, *31 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissentmg).

COMMERCE VIA THE INTERNET: THE FUTURE OF DOING BUSINESS

"The Court has decided that a state-owned television network
no
bl" ti to allow every candidate access to" political debates that It sponsors .. . I do
that decision." Arkansas Educ.
Con;un'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct.
1633, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 3102, *30 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissentmg).
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The dissent notes that Forbes was not considered by AETC staff "a serious candidate
as determined by the voters of Arkansas," Record, Letter to
Adometto .from Amy
Oliver Barnes dated June 19, 1992, attached as Exh. 2 to
of Amy.Ohver Barnes.
The dissent goes on to make a great deal of the fact that had 'been a senous
fi th Republican nomination for Lieutenant Governor m both 1986 and, especially, .m
or ewhen he received 46.88% of the statewide
·
· a. thr
·
and received
1990
pnmary
a ma"ority vote in 15 ofthe 16 Third Congressional Distnct counties. Arkansas Educ.
Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1998
LE'?S
(1998)
.
Stevens, J., dissenting). Since the margin Republican wmner s VIctory m
1992 Third
District election was only 3.02%, the dissent feels that
of Forbes
from the debate "may have determined the outcome." Arkansas Educ. TelevlSlon
Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 31?2, *33 (1998) (Stevens, J., .
dissenting) This suggests that if Forbes did not have qwte so strong a track
If
the race had not been so close, he would not have had a
right to
in the debate. It seems clear that most independent candidates do not ha:e
s .
political track record nor are most races so close.
dissent s analysis,
most independent candidates would not have Forbes's constitutional
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It Is. run. This .
concern might result in the participation of more candidates m races m which the result IS
less certain.
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Introduction
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Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1998 U.S. LEXIS
3102, *35 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

121

12s

Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 93 F.3d 497, 505 (8th Cir. 1996).

129 Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1998 U.S. LEXIS
3102, *35 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

For example, a dissent argument in favor of Forbes
debate is that
he raised more many than another, majority party, candidate who was InVIted. Arkansas
Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 3102, *34 (1998)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971).

The Internet has revolutionized the way business is conducted, and therefore it
has become an invaluable tool of commerce. It provides for the convenience of
purchasing goods at home and, therefore, allows customers to save valuable time and
money. Consumers can easily bid on merchandise through on-line auctions, perform
price comparisons, and even print postage. They also have the ability to engage in
financial transactions and trade stock. Because of the World Wide Web, merchants
have been able to establish business without storefronts and service customers
throughout the country and around the world. 58 million people in the United States
and Canada used the Internet in 1997, a 14% increase from 1996. 1 Ten million of
those users purchased goods and services on-line. 2 Retailers, such as Amazon.com,
reported revenues
at an estimated 1.4 billion dollars in 1999 from business-to3
consumer sales. According to a recent report prepared by Penn State's Smeal College
of Business Administration, U.S. Business-to-Business sales on the Internet are
expected to reach $183 billion dollars in 2001. 4 This lucrative method of commerce
has allowed business organizations to reap overwhelming profits.
Although many consumers are utilizing the Internet to make purchases and
obtain information, there are still skeptics who have not ventured into cyberspace to
take advantage of the services available. Often, concerns are focused on the
5
protection of the right of privacy.
A 1998 poll published in Business Week
indicated that 61% of those who do not use the Internet would be more likely to do so
if they thought their personal information would be protected. 6 This article shall
address the issues raised by the advent of electronic commerce such as privacy,
security and consumer confidence. Also discussed will be the safeguards that can be
utilized to address these concerns.
II.

CONSUMER CONCERNS

A. CONFIDENTIALITY & SECURITY

The protection of ones privacy is a priority to those ·persons purchasing goods
via the Net. The fear of transacting business over the Internet stems from the concern
over the use and distribution of personal information that is often required to utilize
some web sites. Moreover, the threat of security breaks when banking transactions
and purchases are conducted electronically fosters the need for privacy. 7 Many
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